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Abstract 
For years, the EU has refrained from criticising China’s attempts to shape globalisation according to its 
own interests. Member states have allowed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to tip the balance of power 
towards the companies that China owns or subsidises.  
Alarmed by recent Chinese takeovers in strategic industries, the EU has flagged up its intention to 
toughen rules on foreign investment flows into Europe. The brand-new EU Strategic Outlook on China 
adopts a multifaceted approach and defines the ‘Middle Kingdom’ simultaneously as a cooperation and 
negotiation partner with whom the Union needs to find a balance of interests, an “economic 
competitor” in pursuit of technological leadership, and a “systemic rival” promoting alternative models 
of governance. 
This paper takes stock of BRI investments in Europe and of member states’ concerns about economic 
and national security. It then examines the EU-wide legal bulwarks and regulatory responses that are 
intended to hedge against unfair practices. It concludes that, while a more realistic and assertive 
European approach toward Chinese market behaviour is welcome, the EU should take China up on its 
pledge to embolden the BRI with ‘soft connectivity’, i.e. a legal infrastructure, rather than risk mutual 
harm by adopting too protectionist a stance. This should benefit not just the EU and China but also the 
other ‘16+1’ countries along the central corridor of the BRI, which passes through the Caucasus, the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe – all in the spirit of the EU’s 2018 connectivity strategy with Asia. 
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The gentleman aims at harmony, not uniformity. 
Confucius 
1. Introduction 
When the European Commission approved the Hungarian government’s €45 million 
investment aid to the Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) BorsodChem1 in September 2018, 
the legal obstacles that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had encountered in the single market 
of the EU were removed to serve the “community interest”. While the Commission concluded 
that the investment in BorsodChem was not economically sound,2 it found that the aid would 
not unduly distort competition in the single market but rather help job creation, regional 
development and the attainment of environmental objectives. 
The BorsodChem case exemplifies a growing dissonance in perceptions about the BRI as a 
shared opportunity between the EU and China. For China, the BorsodChem aniline project 
embodies the motto of the BRI, i.e. ‘win-win cooperation’ that promotes common 
development and prosperity3 between China and a BRI hosting country. Seen in this light, 
BorsodChem is a concrete deliverable,4 a milestone in implementing the BRI and the China-
CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) cooperation, also known as the ‘16+1 Initiative 
Cooperation’.5 As such, the BRI appears more of a grand geopolitical strategy than an economic 
blueprint.6 
                                                     
1 In 2011, China’s Wanhua Industrial Group acquired full control of BorsodChem in a €1.2 billion deal. See “Wanhua 
takes full control of BorsodChem”, Financial Times, 1 February 2011. 
2 This is because, without the public funding, the project would not have been carried out in Hungary or any other 
member states. It would have been cheaper to continue importing aniline from the group’s parent company in 
China. Also, the aid is limited to the minimum necessary to make the project profitable for the company’s decision 
to invest. The €45 million state aid is Hungary’s additional financial support to the €142 million investment in a 
new facility for producing aniline at BorsodChem’s existing plant, which currently imports aniline from its parent 
company, the Wanhua Industrial Group, headquartered in Shandong Province, China. See European Commission, 
“State Aid: Commission approves Hungary’s €45 million investment aid to chemical company BorsodChem Zrt to 
be in line with EU State aid rules”, Press release, Brussels, 28 September 2018. 
3 See NRDC, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, 
RPC, 28 March 2018 (http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html). 
4 In May 2017, as the first deliverable of the Sino-Hungary €1 billion loan facility cooperation, the China 
Development Bank provided an €79 million on-lending loan to fund the construction of a chlorine production line 
at BorsodChem. See China Development Bank Annual Report 2017, at 49. 
5 See China’s Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries, 
published at the “16+1” Summit, Warsaw, 2012. 
6 A White House spokesman has recently criticised the BRI as “made in China, for China”. See G. Rachman, “The 
US, China and the return of a two-bloc world”, Financial Times, 11 March 2019. The 2018 US National Defense 
Strategy builds on the 2017 National Security Strategy’s qualification of China as a ‘revisionist power’ and defines 
China as “a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features 
in the South China Sea”. See https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
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After decades of foreign policy characterised by Deng Xiaoping as “lying low” and “biding time” 
- intended to focus on domestic development for a harmonious society, a more assertive China 
has emerged, staging its leadership desire in regional and international affairs. Launched in a 
speech by Xi Jinping in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative7 is the most ambitious project since 
the 2001 creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The BRI has been developed ‘on 
the fly’ but nevertheless attracted the active participation of nearly half the UN membership. 
Lured by the power and the purse of the world’s emerging hegemon, governments around the 
world (from Indonesia to the UK and from Tanzania to Brazil) have signed up to multimillion 
dollar loans provided by Chinese financial institutions and the Asian International Infrastructure 
Bank (AIIB).8 These loans have been used to invest mainly in ‘hard connectivity’, i.e. transport, 
energy and infrastructure projects, often carried out by Chinese SOEs. Shrouded in secrecy and 
marred by allegations of corruption, some (successor) governments at the receiving end have 
since been forced to “cough up” ports, bridges and roads when they defaulted on the terms of 
their contracts.9 
Given the scale, political drive and financial means committed by China 
to the BRI, much of the cash-strapped world was initially star-struck, but 
now increasingly sees it a challenge. In Europe, China has long had a 
reputation for insufficient protection of intellectual property rights and 
poor oversight of its export control rules regarding sensitive 
technologies. In several European capitals, frustrations about how 
China has  pushed its domestic growth agenda are compounded by 
worries about Beijing’s ‘imperialist’ tendencies; worries that China is 
throwing its economic weight and political clout around along the new 
Silk Road.10 Weakened by years of economic crisis and alarmed at reports about the “debt 
traps” that China has been laying along the Belt and Road, the EU has flagged its intention to 
get tougher on FDI inflows into Europe.11 Other concerns about industrial espionage, national 
                                                     
7 Originally called One Belt One Road (OBOR), then Belt and Road (Initiative). On 28 March 2015, China published 
the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road to unveil 
the principles, framework, cooperation priorities and mechanisms in the BRI. On 20 June 2017, the State Council 
further published the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative in order to synchronise 
development plans and promote joint actions among countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.  
8 See the Economic Development along the Belt and Road 2017, by China Development Bank (CDB), United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and Peking University (PKU). 
9 See M. Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port”, New York Times, 25 June 2018. In Europe too, 
questions have been raised about the economic logic of China’s BRI investment in infrastructure. A state-of-the-
art highway from the Montenegrin port city of Bar to the Serbian border is a case in point. See N. Barkin and A. 
Vasovic, “Chinese ‘highway to nowhere’ haunts Montenegro”, Reuters, 16 July 2018.  
10 See J. Anderlini, “China is at risk of becoming a colonial power”, Financial Times, 19 September 2018.  
11 See, e.g. Commission Decision of 29 November 2017 setting up the group of experts on the screening of foreign 
direct investments into the European Union, C(2017) 7866 final. In his speech before the European Parliament on 
17 April 2018, French President Macron gave new political impetus to plans to develop an EU-wide FDI screening 
mechanism. See https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/04/17/speech-by-emmanuel-macron-
president-of-the-republic-at-european-parliament.en. 
Weakened by years of 
economic crisis and alarmed 
at reports about the “debt 
traps” that China has been 
laying along the Belt and 
Road, the EU has flagged its 
intention to get tougher on 
FDI inflows into Europe. 
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security and public order have led several EU member states to reject Chinese investments or 
acquisitions in strategic sectors such as telecoms (cf. the role of Huawei in developing 5G 
wireless networks – Box 7),12 nuclear energy (cf. the modernisation of two nuclear reactors in 
the Czech Republic – Box 4), robotics (cf. the successful takeover of German firm Kuka – Box 8) 
and semi-conductors with dual-use potential (cf. the failed attempt to buy German chip maker 
Aixtron – Box 9). 
Apart from the challenges posed to their slowly recovering economies, the majority of 
European governments are aware of the risk that China is upsetting the Western-led 
governance mechanisms by using the BRI as an instrument to export its own development 
model.13 In so doing it is eroding the principles of international trade and investment such as 
national treatment, reciprocity, transparency, environment-friendly rules and social 
sustainability. “On which standards are we operating?” has become an apparent question in 
European policy circles. 
Rather than debunking the Belt and Road Initiative outright, the European Commission and 
High Representative recently proposed a policy shift by stating the EU’s terms of engagement 
with China in a new ‘Strategic Outlook’, which was welcomed by the Foreign Affairs Council on 
18 March 2019.14 Stating that “there is a growing appreciation in Europe that the balance of 
challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted” and that “China can no longer be 
regarded as a developing country”, the EU strategy adopts a multifaceted approach and defines 
the Middle Kingdom simultaneously, in different policy areas, as: 
“a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiation 
partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic 
competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting 
alternative models of governance.” 
The EU’s ten-point action plan aims to fill the current gaps in EU law on competition and state 
aid, investment and procurement. In a prelude to the plans, China’s Ambassador to the EU had 
                                                     
12 “Huawei: ‘Deep concerns’ over firm’s role in UK 5G upgrade”, BBC World News, 27 December 2018. See also K. 
Dębiec, J. Groszkowski, M. Bogusz and J. Jakóbowski, “The Czech-Chinese dispute over Huawei and ZTE”, OSW 
Analyses, 17 January 2019. 
13 Following Xi Jinping’s speech of 17 January 2017 at the Davos World Economic Forum, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs summarised the main characteristics of China’s new economic diplomacy: guiding the world economy, 
championing global development, improving the model of economic governance, supporting national 
development strategies and sharing China’s development philosophy. See ‘China’s Economic Diplomacy Entered 
the New Era’, published in April 2017. 
14 Joint Communication, “EU-China – A strategic outlook”, JOIN(2019) 5 final, Strasbourg, 12 March 2019. The 
document “refines” the EU’s approach to China, as laid down in the 2016 EU Strategy on China, to be “more 
realistic, assertive and multi-faceted”. See the Foreign Affairs Conclusions of 18 March 2019. The EU Strategy on 
China was adopted by the Council on 18 July 2016, doc. 11252/16.   
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warned EU leaders not to draw “an Iron Curtain” which would “upset global economic and 
scientific innovation”.15 
This CEPS Policy Insight takes stock of BRI investments in Europe and of member states’ 
concerns about economic and national security (section 2). An analysis of the EU-wide legal 
bulwarks and regulatory responses to address those concerns (section 3) will then allow us to 
collect ideas on how to increase transparency and convergence between not just the EU and 
China, but also the other ‘16+1’ countries along the central corridor of the BRI, which passes 
through the Caucasus, the Balkans and Eastern Europe (section 4), all in the spirit of the EU’s 
connectivity strategy with Asia.16 It concludes that, while a more realistic and assertive EU 
approach toward Chinese market behaviour is welcome, the EU should take China up on its 
pledge to embolden the BRI with ‘soft connectivity’, i.e. a legal infrastructure, to truly achieve 
win-win cooperation,17 rather than risk mutual harm by adopting too protectionist a stance. 
2. Transition of China’s growth model and impact on Europe 
Since 2013, there has been a surge of Chinese investment in the EU. Overall it accounts for one- 
quarter of EU FDI in China. After China’s August 2017 State Council published guidelines to curb 
“irrational” Chinese outbound FDI in sectors such as real estate, hotels, entertainment, sports 
clubs and outdated industries, Chinese FDI in the EU has decreased, following an international 
trend.18 This decrease may also be the consequence of the investment-screening regimes that 
individual EU member states have been modernising. Chinese FDI in the EU fell to €29.1 billion 
in 2017, and further dropped to €17.3 billion in 2018 (Figure 1). Nonetheless, compared to 
2016 figures, Chinese FDI in the EU in 2017 remained high in the sectors of transport, utilities 
and infrastructure, where investment doubled and jumped from €7.1 to €15.3 billion, but then 
suffered a decline in 2018; while the biggest increases were recorded in financial services, 
health and biotech, consumer products and services, and automotive (Figure 2).19  
                                                     
15 Z. Ming, “Digital ‘Iron Curtain’ makes no sense in 5G era”, EU Observer, 26 February 2019. 
16 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the 
Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, “Connecting Europe and Asia – Building blocks for 
an EU Strategy”, JOIN(2018) 31 final, 19 September 2018, adopted by the Council of the EU on 15 October 2018. 
17 Such announcements were made by Wang Yi, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his deputy 
Kong Xuanyou at the first Forum on Belt and Road Legal Cooperation held on 2-3 July 2018 in Beijing. See Xu Wei, 
“Beijing will work to ensure Belt, Road transparent”, China Daily, 4 July 2018. 
18 Note that later the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued the Administrative Measures 
for Outbound Investment of Enterprises, came into force on 1 March 2018, with the same guidelines. 
19 T. Hanemann et al., “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies”, Merics Papers 
on China, March 2019, at 9. Private investors like China’s Touchstone Capital Partners still make plans for hardware 
projects, like an undersea tunnel project linking Tallinn and Helsinki. See P. Goble, “Beijing Reportedly Ready to 
Finance Helsinki-Tallinn Tunnel”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 16, Issue 34, 12 March 2019. 
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Figure 1. Chinese investment in the EU, 2010-18 
 
Source: T. Hanemann et al., “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies”, Merics 
Papers on China, March 2019, at 10.  
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Figure 2. Volume and sectors of Chinese investment in Europe since 2010 
 
Source: T. Hanemann et al., “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies”, Merics 
Papers on China, March 2019, at 13. 
 
The rise in Chinese FDI in Europe in 2013 coincided with the launch of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Towards the end of its 13th five-year plan (2016-20) China is transitioning from an 
export and investment-reliant growth model to a slower, more sustainable and inclusive 
growth pattern, based more on innovation, domestic consumption and the service industry. 
The BRI embodies the blending of old and new approaches in the execution of this strategic 
vision. 
There is still the investment in ‘hardware’ (road, rail, bridges, ports, airports, utilities and 
energy) along the many branches of the BRI into Eurasia, the Middle East and parts of Africa, 
for land, maritime, digital and space connectivity. Much of China’s investment in southern and 
eastern parts of Europe has been in utilities and energy, or involves upgrading existing 
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infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus in Greece, where the SOE China Ocean Shipping 
(Group) Company (COSCO) has acquired a 51% stake of the Piraeus Port Authority (Box 1). As 
an integral part of the BRI, and in addition to its stake in Rotterdam and Antwerp, which 
amounts to 35% (143.3 million euro) and 25% (133.9 million euro) respectively, COSCO’s recent 
expansion in the Belgian port of Zeebrugge (Box 2) has significantly increased the company’s 
presence in the North Sea.20 Such acquisitions of EU port infrastructure not only produce 
economic benefits to the ports concerned but also advance China’s state interests in the EU, 
with access to strategic logistics platforms enabling further opportunities to expand business 
interests and, inevitably, political influence. The latter touches on the core motive of the EU’s 
forthcoming foreign investment screening instrument (section 3.4). 
Box 1. COSCO in the Port of Piraeus 
The Port of Piraeus is the largest Greek seaport and one of the biggest in the Mediterranean Sea 
and Europe. Since the Greek government-debt crisis started in late 2009, the Greek government 
planned to privatise several state-owned assets, worth around €50 billion. One of these assets 
is the port of Piraeus. In October 2009 Greece leased docks 2 and 3 from the Piraeus Port 
Authority (PPA) to COSCO for a 35-year-period. For this COSCO pays €100 million per year. 
COSCO has operated Piraeus's No 2 pier since June 2010 and built its No 3 pier. In August 2015, 
COSCO took a 51% stake in PPA for €280.5 million. COSCO is expected to increase its stake by 
16% to 67% over the next five years for an additional €88 million, if certain conditions such as 
completing the mandatory investments up to €300 million, are met. Economic performance of 
container handling has greatly improved since 2009. Before COSCO took over, the port's 
container handling record was at 1.5 million TEUs (20-foot equivalent units). These figures rose 
to 3,692 million containers in 2017.  
Box 2. COSCO in the Port of Zeebrugge 
In September 2017 COSCO acquired the remaining 76% of the stake in the APM Terminals 
Zeebrugge (APMTZ) for €35 million. The APMTZ has thus become COSCO’s first 100%-owned 
terminal in northwest Europe. In January 2018, a concession agreement was signed between 
COSCO and the Zeebrugge Port Authority for the CSP Terminal in Zeebrugge. Subsequently, 
COSCO and the French shipping company CMA CGM signed an MoU for an investment of 10% 
in the terminal. In addition, in October 2018 the Shanghai Lingang Overseas Development Co., 
Ltd. signed an agreement to invest €85.3 million to establish a 30-ha logistic park. 
 
The difficult and drawn-out infrastructure process has gone in tandem with China’s ambitious 
aims to move beyond being the world’s largest manufacturer to achieving high-technology 
supremacy. Ushered in by China’s State Council in 2015, the ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy aims 
                                                     
20 COSCO’s other acquisitions of EU port infrastructure have taken place in Rotterdam, Antwerp, Noatum Port, 
Vado Ligure. See G. Grieger, “China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative increasingly touches the EU”, European 
Parliamentary Research Service, March 2018.   
10 | BLOCKMANS & HU 
 
to diminish foreign technology in Chinese manufacturing and replace 70% of it with indigenous 
content and materials, and to create national champions in ten high-tech strategic 
manufacturing sectors.21 The way the strategy is conceived suggests an increasingly 
competitive China which may soon drive Europe, the US and Japan out of their global leadership 
positions in technology.22 This strategy explains why Chinese FDI is mainly driven by market- 
and strategic asset-seeking motives, why it is focused on big EU member state economies, and 
why it targets cutting-edge technologies. 
Although the current emphasis of Chinese FDI is still on transport, 
infrastructure and energy projects, a new focus on advanced 
industrial machinery and equipment, ICT and (financial) 
technologies in the key sectors identified by the ‘Made in China 
2025’ strategy is gradually coming online. After having been 
qualified by the Chinese authorities as “irrational” outbound 
investment that is at odds with national strategic priorities, Chinese 
investment in sectors such as real estate (big in London) and 
entertainment has seen a decline.23 
Although Chinese FDI in the EU fell to €30 billion in 2017, a 
17% drop compared to the year before, China’s investment 
focus on sectors of “strategic importance” has raised 
unprecedented concerns in Brussels and among member 
states because of the risks to national security or public order 
that such investments entail. For the question of national 
security, the risks lie with Chinese SOEs, which are the main 
investors in Europe: 68% in 2017 (Figure 3).24  
                                                     
21 The ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy envisages three steps of development: 1) in 10 years’ time till 2025 - to turn 
China into a major manufacturing power; 2) between 2025-35 - aiming for China to reach intermediate level 
among the manufacturing world powers; 3) by 2049, China should be able to transform itself into the global 
manufacturing leader. 
The ten strategic sectors targeted by the ‘Made in China 2025’ programme are: new information technology, 
numerical control tools and robotics, energy saving and new energy vehicles, power equipment, aerospace and 
aeronautical equipment, new materials, ocean engineering equipment and high-tech ships, biological medicine 
and medical devices, modern railway equipment, agricultural machinery.  
22 In certain sectors China already tops global charts. China's CRRC Corporation Ltd., for instance, is the world's 
largest supplier of rail transit equipment with the most complete product lines and leading technologies. Ranking 
385 on the Fortune Global 500 List (2018), CRRC’s R&D investments represent €1.408 billion, which puts it in 
position 96 onto the World Top 2,500 R&D Investors.   
23 See the outbound investment guidelines published by the State Council in August 2017. See also “China to keep 
monitoring ‘irrational’ overseas investments: state planner”, Reuters, 18 July 2017. 
24 See T. Hanemann and M. Huotari, “EU-China FDI: Working Towards Reciprocity in Investment Relations”, Merics 
Papers on China, No. 3, May 2018, at 30.  
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order that such investments entail. 
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Figure 3. Top 25 Chinese acquirers in Europe25 
 
The risks to ‘public order’ have to do with certain investment practices of Chinese SOEs that do 
not follow market principles. Although SOEs from Europe and other countries, such as the 
Singaporean Temasek Holdings, also invest around the globe in strategic sectors, their 
behaviour is expected to be based on commercial considerations and to be non-discriminatory 
vis-à-vis other market players.26  
China-specific concerns about unfair competition are to a large extent related to the 
particularities of the Chinese political economy, where state interference prevails over market 
                                                     
25 “How China is buying its way in Europe”, Bloomberg, 22 June 2018. 
26 Article XVII, GATT. 
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forces, and the lines between the public and the private sector are blurred. The latter took 
place in the wake of the first rounds of SOE reforms in the 1990s when SOEs undertook drastic 
measures for reorganisation, corporatisation and privatisation (stock-exchange listing), in the 
run-up to China’s WTO accession in 2001. Granted easy access to government funds and 
favourable policies, Chinese SOE operations often neglect the principles at home. When 
competing with ordinary market players for a merger & acquisition deal abroad, a Chinese SOE 
would also comfortably defeat its competitors. This constitutes unfair competition, especially 
for private market operators, and distorts the market order.  
Chinese FDI flowing into the EU also tends to arouse more suspicion about a hidden political 
agenda than previous waves of FDI from the US, Japan and South Korea. China’s one-party state 
is an outlier with significant economic leverage, which promotes principles and norms that are 
frequently at odds with those of self-proclaimed liberal democracies, including the rule of law, 
transparency and fair competition. In the EU, China has a reputation for insufficient protection 
of intellectual property rights and for poor oversight of its export control rules (e.g. of sensitive 
technologies to ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea).  
It is against this background that Europe has gradually been erecting its legal defences. Security 
and public order concerns linked to FDI are addressed at either the EU or member state levels 
through competition law, rules on state aid and public procurement. We discuss these sets of 
rules in turn. 
3. European regulatory response mechanisms  
3.1 EU competition law 
Competition law’s most salient tool is the EU Merger Regulation.27 The regulation is based on 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits 
cartels and anti-competitive agreements, and Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position. It focuses on screening mergers and acquisitions for their ensuing economic 
power in the relevant (geographical and product) market, so as to ensure fair and undistorted 
competition in the EU’s single market. The enforcement of the EU Merger Regulation is shared 
between the European Commission and the member states’ anti-trust authorities, as defined 
in EU law (the division is mainly based on turnover thresholds – the ‘de minimis’ rule). The 
Commission does not shy away from investigating the most powerful companies, from state-
controlled Gazprom to free-marketeering Google, for perceived abuse of a dominant position. 
Fines can be hefty, as shown when Facebook was fined €110 million for providing misleading 
information about its takeover of WhatsApp, and Google €4.34 billion for illegal practices 
regarding Android mobile devices to increase the dominance of its search engine. The purpose 
of enforcing competition rule is to make the single market work better for all companies to 
compete equally and fairly. Consumers, businesses and the whole European economy will 
                                                     
27 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. 
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benefit as a consequence. This principle may be illustrated by the Alstom-Siemens rail merger 
proposal, which was blocked by the Commission in February 2019 (Box 3). The economic weight 
of the largest single market in the world and the Commission’s tough anti-trust control has 
elevated the EU to the status of global norm-setter in this field.  
Box 3. Alstom-Siemens rail merger proposal 
The Alstom-Siemens Rail Merger proposal was prompted by the increasingly dominant position 
of CRRC Corporation Ltd., China’s railway juggernaut in the market of design, manufacture, 
testing, commissioning and maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock. The proposal 
intended to create a European rail equivalent of Airbus, with revenues of about €15 billion 
making it able to compete with CRRC, the world’s biggest train manufacturer. Although the 
Commission acknowledged that European industries are facing unfair competition from state-
backed companies from China, it blocked the Alstom-Siemens rail merger proposal in February 
2019 because of the impending breach of EU competition rules. According to the Commission, 
the merger would have resulted in higher prices in signalling systems and the next generations 
of high-speed trains, for which Alstom and Siemens were unable to propose remedies.  
The French and German finance ministers have called the Commission’s decision to veto the 
Alstom-Siemens deal a mistake and proposed a drastic overhaul of the EU’s strict competition 
rules, including the need to systematically base decisions on global rather than European or 
national market share. Reacting to those statements, the Commission has argued that, should 
the merger have gone through, a European champion would have been created in the above-
mentioned two markets, thereby pushing customers to look for a cheaper supplier – “de facto 
inviting” foreign competitors like CRRC into the market.28 To level the playing field with Chinese 
and other state-backed rivals, European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager has 
suggested that the EU make better use of its trade defence instruments (i.e. public procurement 
rules and FDI screening, see section 3.4 below) and that member states should tap into the EU 
programme that allows state aid for projects of common European interest.29  
 
The main function of EU competition law is to regulate the market behaviour of all economic 
operators, irrespective of their origin. So far, Chinese investors have not established dominant 
positions in relevant European markets, any abuse of which would trip the wire of Article 102 
TFEU. Whereas EU merger control also caters for the screening of acquisitions of European 
                                                     
28 R. Toplensky, “Vestager warns against weakening merger rules”, Financial Times, 4 March 2019. 
29 See Communication from the Commission, “Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market 
of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest”, OJ C 188, 20.6.2014, 
at 4. The programme was first used in December 2018 to approve €1.75 billion in government funding from 
France, Germany, Italy and the UK for a research and innovation project on sensors, chips and other micro-
electronics at the heart of household and industrial devices linked to the internet (‘the internet of things’). See 
Commission press release No. IP/18/6862, 18 December 2018. France, Germany and Poland are considering 
funding a scheme to build next generation batteries for electric vehicles. The development of 5G networks could 
be another candidate. 
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companies, it does not allow the Commission to intervene against take-overs solely on the 
grounds that the buyer benefitted from foreign subsidies. Trade defence instruments should 
be able to address unfair subsidies. In view of the finding that the BRI is primarily explored and 
exploited by state-owned and government-controlled companies and banks from China,30 it 
makes sense to consider EU rules on state aid and public procurement more closely and then 
look into investment-screening mechanisms. 
3.2 EU rules on state aid and public procurement 
State aid 
After the China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) was given the green light to expand the 
nuclear plant at Cernavodă in Romania in 2013 – together with a 51% stake in the joint venture 
company (in spite of being a sole bidder in the announced tender), China’s botched attempt to 
woo the President and cajole the government of the Czech Republic into accepting an offer to 
modernise two nuclear reactors at Dukovany has taught Beijing one thing: bypassing stringent 
EU transparency and public procurement rules is not a given, even when dealing with a member 
state’s malleable leadership (Box 4).31 
Box 4. Upgrade and expansion of nuclear reactors in Czechia 
Czech President Milos Zeman has long fostered ties with Beijing, culminating in a state visit by 
President Xi Jinping in 2016 and the appointment of Ye Jianming, the founder of Chinese 
investment conglomerate CEFC, as Zeman’s advisor. Following the signature of a memorandum 
on 5 November 2016,32 Czech media revealed that China pressed the Czech government to 
promise that CEFC would be guaranteed work on the proposed Dukovany nuclear reactor 
without a public tender having to take place. The scandal led the Czech government to slam the 
brakes and invoke EU transparency and procurement rules to open up the tender procedure. Ye 
has since fallen out favour of Beijing and Zeman has turned to supporting the Russian 
government in the bid of state-controlled Rosatom to upgrade and expand Dukovany along the 
same contentious lines as Hungary’s deal with Moscow over Paks II (See Box 5).33 Among the 
other five bidders is CEFC’s competitor CGN. How the relevant actors play their cards now is 
critical, as a Russian- or Chinese-run expansion of nuclear energy capabilities would shape not 
just the Czech Republic’s geopolitical options for decades to come but also impact relations with 
neighbouring Austria and other EU member states. 
 
                                                     
30 The cost of the Belgrade-Budapest high speed railway construction project is already estimated at $3.6 billion 
(€3.18 billion). China Railway International Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of China are the project’s 
contractor and financier. The Hungarian State Railway is due to implement it. 
31 See D. Rohac, “Murky Nuclear Business in New Europe”, The American Interest, 12 November 2018. 
32 Available at https://www.mzv.cz/file/2831905/Memorandum_o_porozumeni.pdf.  
33 See N. Warton, “Czechs risk wrath of EU over nuclear power project”, Politico, 22 February 2018. 
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Dukovany is close to the border with Austria, where strong and well-organised opposition to 
nuclear energy, underscored by the country’s 1978 referendum on the subject, is intent on 
torpedoing any expansion of existing nuclear structures in neighbouring countries through legal 
challenges at the EU level. 
The EU places stringent restrictions on state aid to investment projects involving private parties. 
Article 107 TFEU denounces any aid that may distort competition or affect trade between 
member states. Article 108(3) TFEU therefore obliges member states to notify the Commission 
of any plan to grant such aid. In light of this principle and for reasons laid out above, Chinese 
state funding pouring into the EU is regarded with suspicion as it is could harm the EU’s 
industrial base, its long-term global competitiveness in strategic sectors, and hence its future 
economic prosperity.  
By virtue of Article107(3)(a) and (c) TFEU, certain state aid may, however, be found compatible 
with the internal market if it is granted for the purpose of supporting economic development 
in disadvantaged regions and for creating economic activities and jobs. To qualify, such aid must 
fall within the scope provided by the Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-202034 and pass 
the compatibility assessment that is to be undertaken by the Commission after notification. 
The Commission will test for, inter alia, a well-defined objective of a common interest and the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the aid measure to address it, avoidance of undue 
negative effects on competition and trade, and transparency. The Commission’s approval of 
the construction of two nuclear reactors in Hungary summarises how the state aid rules are 
applied within the internal market. 
Box 5. Paks II nuclear reactors in Hungary 
With four reactors constructed in the 1980s by the Soviet Union, the Paks nuclear plant 
generates approximately 50% of Hungary’s domestic electricity supply. In view of the 
government’s plan to construct two new nuclear reactors on the site, 120km from Budapest, 
the European Commission launched two separate investigations against the country in 
November 2015. The first was to assess whether Hungary’s financing plan constituted state aid, 
in breach of Article 107 TFEU. The second investigation was for possible infringement of EU 
public procurement rules and procedures after the Hungarian government had directly awarded 
the construction of two new reactors and the refurbishment of two additional reactors to 
Russia’s Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation without launching a transparent 
procurement procedure.35  
The total costs of the project were estimated at €12.5 billion, of which 80% would be covered 
by an €10 billion Russian loan and 20% by the Hungary’s’ own contribution. Budapest insisted 
that because the agreements were “between private companies” they were not published in 
order to protect the enterprises’ business interests. And because Hungary had not considered 
                                                     
34 OJ C 209/01, 23.07.2013. 
35 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-6006_en.htm.   
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using public money, for the risk of breaching EU state aid rules, it had not expected the 
Commission to launch a probe into the funding of Paks II.36  
As a result of the first investigation, the Commission concluded in March 2017 that Hungary’s 
financial support for the construction of the Paks II project did amount to state aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, as the Hungarian state would accept a lower return on its 
investment than a private investor would, while the EU rules require state aid to be limited and 
proportionate to the objectives pursued in order to be approved. The Commission nevertheless 
approved the financial support because the Hungarian government had promised to limit 
distortions of competition, including avoiding market concentration.37 
As a result of the second investigation, the Commission dropped infringement proceedings 
against Hungary. The Commission found that, while the Russian investor in the Paks II project 
had been selected without calling a tender, Hungary had not violated EU directives which allow 
for public procurement without competition if the contract can only reasonably be given to one 
company. The Commission noted that Hungary had sufficiently justified that its use of the 
‘technical exclusivity exemption’, which caters for the situation that the technical and safety 
requirements of the project can only be met by one company, was compatible with EU law so 
as to award the contract directly. The Commission’s decision was widely criticised for letting 
technical requirements prevail over the protection of general interest and is now 
being challenged by Austria for breaching EU state aid rules. 
 
EU rules on state aid are likely to be applicable to China’s major investments in transport and 
energy infrastructure along the BRI branches that stretch into the European Union, especially 
when the investment comes in the form of a loan that is granted to a BRI project through an 
inter-bank on-lending facility between, for example, the China Development Bank and a 
national bank of a member state.38 To be exempted from the prohibition to give state aid, 
criteria such as economic development and job creation must be met. After that, a relevant 
Chinese investment must pass the compatibility assessment of regional aid, and questions such 
as appropriateness and proportionality of the financial assistance must be answered with 
satisfaction before the Commission may grant a waiver. Note that within the context of the 
internal market, state aid means any aid, regardless of its form, granted to certain undertakings 
by national public authorities. Within this context, the Commission’s investigation and 
clearance of the BosodChem project is a case in point (section 1). 
                                                     
36 For details, see https://budapestbeacon.com/hungary-russia-sign-3-implementation-agreements-paks-ii/.  
37 See State Aid: Commission clears investment in construction of Paks II nuclear power plant in Hungary, European 
Commission Press Release, Brussels, 6 March 2017. 
38 For example, the China Development Bank (CDB) sponsored the establishment of the China-CEEC Interbank 
Association. It is revealed that, in May 2017, through an €79 million on-lending loan of Hungarian Development 
Bank, the CDB provided funding support to Wanhua-BorsodChem for constructing the chlorine production line, 
thus delivered the first instalment of the in the Sino-Hungary €1 billion loan facility cooperation. See the Annual 
Report 2017, China Development Bank, at 49. 
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Public procurement 
As indicated above, Chinese companies are bound by EU public procurement rules, which are 
based on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and competitiveness. The EU 
public procurement regime eradicates non-tariff barriers in the single market and guarantees 
open and fair access to the procurement of goods and services, one of the fundamental 
freedoms of the single market. This is also in the interests of member states as they will be able 
to acquire ‘value for money’ and efficient use of public funds. 
The EU public procurement regime is presently governed by Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 
February 2014 on public procurement, which is also known as the classical Directive,39 Directive 
2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors,40 and Directive 2014/23/EU of 26 February 2014 on the 
award of concession contracts, but only with a value equal to or greater than €5 million.41 
Within the remit of the EU public procurement directives, all undertakings, either public or 
private, are guaranteed participation in procurement tendering, as long as a public undertaking 
tenderer’s participation does not cause any distortion to competition vis-à-vis private 
undertaking tenderers. With regard to the eligibility of public undertaking tenderers, directly 
or indirectly subsidised undertakings by a state (or other contracting authorities or even by the 
contracting authority itself) may legitimately take part in a tender.42 The criterion that may 
disqualify a tenderer includes “abnormally low tenders”,43 or if a tenderer violates relevant 
labour and environmental legislation. For the former, contracting authorities may reject those 
tenderers if it is proved that they are recipients of illegal state aid. Given that supporting social 
responsibility is an aim of the new EU public procurement system, ‘social inclusion’ as well as 
‘social and labour legislation compliance’ have now become awarding criteria, to encourage 
companies to develop socially responsible products and services. As a result, some of the 
previous awarding factors, such as ‘the most economically advantageous offer’ approach, 
considered as a legitimate discretion that contracting authorities might have exercised in the 
past, will no longer be an awarding criterion alone. Instead, the approach has become ‘best 
value for money’. Specifically, contracting authorities will be able to better take social aspects 
into account on awarding procurement contracts on the basis of the ‘best price-quality ratio’. 
That means a contracting authority can choose the tenders that promote gender equality, 
                                                     
39 OJ L 94/65, 28.03.2014. The Directive coordinates procurement of goods, services and works, for which 
procurement may be undertaken by central government and sub-central contracting authorities, respectively. 
Thresholds under the classical Directive depend on the kind of procurement items – goods, services or works – as 
well as on the procuring authority, which are determined by Regulation (EC) 1336/2013. 
40 OJ L 94/243, 28.03.2014. 
41 OJ L 94/1, 28.03.2014. 
42 Case C-94/99, ARGE Gewässerschutzt v. Bundesministerium für Land und Forstwirtschaft [2000] ECR I-11037. 
43 Under such circumstances, the CJEU ruled, with direct effect, that contracting authorities should examine the 
details of the bid before deciding to award a contract and seek from the tenderer explanations as to the bid 
submitted. Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et Travaux v. Minister of Public Works [1982] ECR I-457. 
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work-life balance or provide more social advantages, including employing long-term 
unemployed or disadvantaged people to carry out the contract.  
At member state level, and as far as subcontracting is concerned, national contracting 
authorities must ensure that tenders comply with environmental, social or labour law 
obligations under EU or national rules, or international agreements. This implies that 
transparency must be ensured throughout the entire subcontracting procedure, from the stage 
of call for tenders to the performance of the contract; while at the same time a chain of 
responsibilities may be drawn up when subcontracting subcontractors. 
Under the current rules, projects with third countries are implemented through international 
agreements. Under such agreements, the parties can agree on specific procurement rules. In 
this case, the EU procurement instruments are not applicable, but such specific procurement 
rules must comply with basic treaty principles of transparency and equal treatment.44 
It is acknowledged that Chinese investors possess certain qualities, such as technical expertise, 
efficiency and a can-do attitude which are highly valuable, especially for large infrastructure 
projects. But due to the massive state funds that they are provided with, a chief legal obstacle 
that Chinese investors face in public procurement tenders in Europe is ‘low price’. 45 And this 
may disqualify their bids since an abnormally low bid, amounting to dumping, is not seen as 
being compatible with the ‘best value for money’ approach adopted by the EU public 
procurement rules, and principles such as fair competition may also be brought to question the 
legitimacy of a Chinese SOE’s bid. The saga of the Pelješac bridge in Croatia illustrates this 
misgiving (Box 6). 
Box 6. Pelješac bridge in Croatia 
The Pelješac bridge project aims to connect the southernmost part of Croatia around Dubrovnik 
to the rest of mainland Croatia, bypassing the 12km stretch of Bosnia and Herzegovina which 
interrupts the Croatian coastline at Neum. The bridge itself will be 55m high and 2.4km long, 
with four lanes. The works are expected to be completed in 2022. The controversy around the 
construction of the bridge boils down to a Chinese SOE’s abnormally low bidding price and 
                                                     
44 The EU’s Strategic Outlook for China states that, “a more strategic approach to the EU's procurement framework 
could help to identify and address obstacles and loopholes that impede a level playing field in (global markets). 
For instance, the rules could be revised or their application strengthened in order to ensure that procurement 
procedures conducted in the EU on the basis of international agreements
 
comply with the (EU legal) principles 
(such as) transparency and equal treatment.” See JOIN(2019) 5 final, 12 March 2019, at 7. 
45 See G. Grieger, “China, the 16+1 format and the EU”, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2018. 
Bad lending practices include Chinese loans that do not envisage public tenders but are usually tied to a Chinese 
SOE, a high-level involvement of Chinese workers, material and equipment, and easily lead to fiscal instability as a 
result of the “quick and easy money” made available with “no strings attached” and, therefore, without demand 
for good governance, environment sustainability, etc. 
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winning a major construction contract, of which 85% of the cost is funded by the EU for €357 
million.46   
The contract for the first phase of the construction of the Pelješac Bridge and access roads was 
awarded in January 2018 to a Chinese consortium led by the China Road and Bridge Corporation 
(CRBC). With 2.08 billion kuna (€283 million), the CRBC not only outbid the competing rivals 
Strabag of Austria (2.62 billion kuna) and a Turkish-Italian consortium comprising Astaldi and IC 
Ictas of Turkey (2.55 billion kuna), it also committed to build the bridge in three and a half years, 
i.e. six months ahead of schedule.  
Strabag and Astaldi-IC Ictas each lodged a complaint to the State Commission for Supervision of 
Public Procurement Procedure (DKOM) for the unusually low winning bid submitted by CRBC. 
They alleged that the bid from CRBC was backed up by Chinese state aid, that this contravened 
EU competition rules, and that therefore the DKOM had an obligation to establish a case of 
dumping. The complaint was dismissed as unfounded by the DKOM in March 2018. Strabag 
subsequently filed an application at the Administrative Court in Zagreb in April 2018, with the 
aim of suspending the construction of the Pelješac bridge, but that application too was turned 
down. 
So far, Bosnian arguments raised against the decisions of the Croatian government and the 
European Commission have not produced any result.  
 
The examples in this section have shown that EU rules on state aid and public procurement 
suffer from two major deficiencies: they only cover aid granted by member states and do not 
fully address the effects within the single market of subsidies 
granted by foreign governments; nor is there a systematic and 
centralised FDI screening on security grounds at EU level. Among 
the 28 EU member states, a majority of them have no screening 
mechanism and in 12 member states with such a mechanism, 
there are significant differences. We will discuss these issues in 
turn, first by focusing on what scope for FDI screening exists at 
the level of the member states, and then by analysing the new 
regulation that will create an EU-wide FDI screening mechanism. 
3.3 FDI screening mechanisms 
National level 
Neither of the above regulatory mechanisms (i.e. EU competition law, rules on state aid and 
public procurement) examines whether FDI from private or public sources may benefit from 
foreign state funding for the implementation of national industrial policy goals. As a result, 
                                                     
46 See “Commission approves EU financing of the Pelješac bridge in Croatia”, Press release, European Commission, 
Brussels, 7 June 2017.  
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there has been a growing perception among certain member states that the existing 
mechanisms are too weak to tackle concerns about alleged ‘unfair competition’ at the national 
level. 
Having said that, by virtue of Article 21 of the EU Merger Regulation, member states have the 
exclusive competence to scrutinise, and therefore to take proper measures with regard to, 
acquisitions in order to protect national interests on the grounds of public security, plurality of 
the media and prudential rules, also known as “recognised interests”, in the defence, media 
and financial services sectors.47 The remit of “recognised interests” may expand, and if a 
member state wishes to adopt certain measures pursuant to a scrutiny the Commission must 
be notified before the measures may be implemented. 
The EU treaties provide two legal bases for the exemption of application of EU law to member 
states’ national security reviews:  
• Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, which excludes the national defence sector, and hence measures 
that the member states consider necessary for the protection of essential interests of 
their security, from the application of the EU treaties; and 
• Article 65(1)(b) TFEU, as a derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement 
of capital and payments as enshrined in Articles 63-66 TFEU.  
Whereas the former legal basis is rather straightforward, the latter has led to more than one 
dispute being brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 
Unlike the other three freedoms of the internal market, involving the free movement of 
persons (including the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment), goods, 
and services, the free movement of capital extends to third countries as well. Article 63(1) TFEU 
provides that: “all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and 
between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited”. Exceptions from its broad 
scope have been interpreted narrowly by the CJEU in its settled case law, notably the 
jurisprudence on member states’ ‘golden share’ arrangements (special shares held in privatised 
former state-owned enterprises). There are two possibilities for EU member states to restrict 
the free movement of capital: by invoking grounds of public policy or public security explicitly 
mentioned in Article 65(1)(b) TFEU, which, however, may not constitute “a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction of this freedom”; and by invoking overriding reasons 
relating to the general interest (environmental protection, town and country planning, and 
consumer protection), as recognised by the CJEU.  
                                                     
47 Otherwise, under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation, the Commission has exclusive competence to assess the 
competitive impact of concentrations with a Community dimension. In this respect, see also Directive 2009/81/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields 
of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, OJ L 216/76, 20.08.2009.    
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Thus, member states cannot unilaterally determine the scope of public security without any 
control by the EU institutions. They may rely on the public security exception only in the 
presence of a “genuine and sufficiently serious threat” to a fundamental interest of society. 
This exception must not be applied for purely economic ends; investors must have an 
opportunity to challenge the decision before a court. Restrictive measures must satisfy the 
proportionality test; that is, they must be necessary to achieve the objectives and there must 
be no less restrictive measure that is equally effective.48 The CJEU has recognised a few 
strategic sectors, such as oil, telecommunications and electricity as vulnerable in this regard, 
but has significantly limited member states’ discretion.49 Following the above-mentioned logic 
of EU competition rules, it is up to the member states to invite the European Commission to 
screen their proposed deals with (enterprises owned by) third states in these strategic sectors. 
At present, 12 member states50 have a legal framework for scrutiny in place or have performed 
case-by-case reviews for reasons of national security or restrictions on qualifications of 
expatriates and reciprocity (Figure 4). The 12 FDI scrutiny mechanisms differ in design and 
scope, for example in terms of prior authorisation and ex post screening. Among the existing 
FDI screening mechanisms, screening thresholds differ from 5 to 50%; some member states 
determine the sectors for screening while others do not; and some confine screening to 
national security while others go beyond this. Also, some member states insist on reciprocity, 
in order to require favourable business considerations to be obtained via bilateral cooperation 
on market access. Some countries undertake reviews because of partial or total prohibitions 
of, or restrictions on, FDI in specified sectors.  
Those member states embracing a narrow interpretation of national security (limited to the 
weapons industry), such as Denmark, Sweden, and Slovenia, have introduced restrictions under 
a specific legal basis. The prevailing approach uses case-by-case scrutiny, while automatic 
scrutiny is mostly linked to the requirement to hold a licence for a commercial activity, such as 
the production of weapons. Ireland has no formal screening mechanism but prohibits foreign 
(and domestic) investment in the armaments sector. Denmark has both a formal scrutiny 
procedure for the weapons industry and excludes FDI from its gas and electricity infrastructure, 
which must remain public property. In Spain and Sweden, screening is mandatory for the 
defence sector, while it is run case-by-case for other sectors.  
In recent years, several member states, including Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal and the UK have revised their FDI screening procedures to determine whether 
essential security interests or public order are endangered by impending acquisitions. Huawei 
is currently being scrutinised in several member states (e.g. Czechia and the UK), as well as the 
                                                     
48 C-54/99 Scientology Church, paragraphs 17 and 18; C–483/99 Commission v France, paragraph 48; C–503/99 
Commission v Belgium, paragraph 47, C-463/00 Commission v. Spain, paragraph 72. 
49 The CJEU has so far only approved the Belgian model in C–503/99 Commission v Belgium, paragraphs 46-55. 
50 Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK.  
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US, Australia and New Zealand, in light of potential threats to national security and 
cybersecurity for its stakes in 5G network infrastructure, equipment and services (Box 7).   
Box 7. Huawei, a potential threat to national security and cybersecurity?  
Given the critical function of 5G wireless networks upon which, for example, the running of 
future smart cities will depend, a potential breach of national security is a legitimate concern. 
While governments monitor each other, individuals’ privacy and business activities are generally 
protected. The US-China Cyber Agreement of September 2015 bears testimony to this norm. 
Article 77 of China’s National Security Law (2015), however, does not differentiate between 
spying on states and individuals. It obliges Chinese citizens and companies like Huawei to provide 
leads and evidence that may harm national security. Huawei’s potential threat to third countries 
national (cyber)security is further aggravated if one considers that China’s Cybersecurity Law 
requires companies to also disclose data localisation and source codes. Article 37 requires that 
personal information and important data collected and generated by critical information 
infrastructure operators in China (e.g. public communications and information services, energy, 
finance, transportation, water conservation, public services and e-governance, as well as other 
critical information – by virtue of Article 31) must be stored in China. If an overseas transfer is 
required due to business needs, a security assessment will be conducted and all relevant laws 
will apply. Moreover, Article 23 stipulates that critical network equipment and special 
cybersecurity products can only be sold or provided after being certified by certified 
establishments.  
Although such requirements may be warranted to safeguard cybersecurity, foreign ICT 
enterprises are most worried, for two reasons. First, they may suffer discrimination with regard 
to their business opportunities for supplying ICT equipment and services in China. It is alleged 
that, since 2015, the Chinese government has increasingly been requiring the use of “secure and 
controllable” or Chinese- developed and/or controlled ICT products, solutions, and services 
based on “cybersecurity” justifications. Second, foreign ICT enterprises are concerned that it 
would become mandatory for vendors to file sensitive IP, such as source code, with the Chinese 
government in order to obtain security clearance. Source code often contains sensitive 
information, be that configuration-related information (e.g. database credentials) or 
information on how the web application functions. If disclosed, such information could be used 
by an attacker to discover logical flaws and escalate into a subsequent chain of attacks that 
would otherwise be impossible without access to the application’s source code. 
Against this legal backdrop, one cannot dismiss Huawei’s global role in telecommunications, its 
competitive capacity in innovation, manufacturing and infrastructure. In recent years, Huawei 
has been one of the top three international patent applicants. In 2017, Huawei was the world’s 
number one filer under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. ZTE was second, followed by Intel, 
Mitsubishi and Qualcomm. Huawei is also poised to become the world’s largest supplier of 5G 
infrastructure. The company has been particularly adept at getting its patents adopted by 3GPP 
(3rd Generation of Partnership Project, a collaboration between groups of telecoms standards 
associations, known as the Organisational Partners) and the International Telecommunication 
Union, two of the major groups that establish international telecom protocols. 
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Following the successful Chinese takeover of Kuka by Midea (Box 8) and the withdrawal of the 
initial clearance for the takeover of Aixtron by a Chinese state-backed consortium (Box 9) in 
2016, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany in July 2017 tightened 
the Foreign Trade Ordinance and introduced obligations to report foreign takeovers of German 
companies in various areas of critical infrastructure, including defence and IT security (and 
cryptographic equipment). The second pillar of the German FDI screening mechanism is cross-
sector scrutiny that may be triggered by the acquisition of more than 25% of voting rights in 
the company to be acquired, although the latter is only applied to investments from non-EU 
and non-European Free Trade Association countries. Similarly, the UK adopted changes to its 
investment-screening mechanism in June 2018, requiring notification of mergers pertaining to 
the development or production of ‘dual use’ items, the design and maintenance of aspects of 
computing hardware, and the development and production of quantum technology. The new 
rules apply to businesses with a UK turnover of more than £1 million, up from £70 million.  
Figure 4. EU member states with an investment-screening mechanism 
 
Sources: Rasmussen Group, “Foreign Investment Screening and the China Factor: New protectionism or new 
European standards?”, 16 November 2017 and European Commission 2017. 
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This patchwork of different mechanisms for screening FDI on national security grounds 
currently in place in nearly half of the member states, coupled with the scrutiny of mergers and 
acquisitions under EU competition rules, has sparked a debate whether Union-level tools 
should be developed to adequately tackle the newly perceived challenges posed by the BRI to 
all member states, i.e. not just those involved in the ‘16+1 format’. 
Box 8. Kuka – Midea’s takeover after obstacles cleared   
Founded in 1898 and described as a “crown jewel” of German industry, Kuka is a leading 
manufacturer of industrial robots and automated productions systems supplying several 
industries, including automotive, medical, solar, and aerospace equipment. Kuka’s sales 
revenues were just under €3 billion in 2015. 
In May 2016, Midea, a domestic appliance manufacturer based in Guangdong Province, China, 
offered to acquire more than 30% of Kuka shares with a value of about €4.5 billion. In an effort 
to prevent Midea’s takeover the German government unsuccessfully tried to put together a 
consortium of German/European investors to buy Kuka. Kuka’s own management and 
supervisory board, and certain shareholders, also opposed Midea’s takeover proposal. But 
Midea’s offer proved too attractive to resist. Valid until 2023, i.e. longer than a usual commercial 
agreement, Midea’s investment agreement guaranteed Kuka staff job security and committed 
to protect business partners’ data, high investment in R&D, as well as to let it operate 
independently and help it expand in China, etc. 
In order to mitigate the potential security threat involved in the takeover, Kuka sold its American 
business KUKA Systems Aerospace North America, which engaged in highly sensitive military-
related activities covered by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), to US 
automation company Advanced Integration Technology Inc. Note that China has been prohibited 
from ownership of ITAR–registered companies since 1989. The Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the US (CFIUS) and the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls granted their 
approval for Midea’s takeover. Thus, all closing conditions of Midea’s tender offer were met. 
The takeover took effect in the first half of January 2017. 
 
Box 9. Aixtron: takeover bid failed on security grounds 
Founded by three employees of the German Institute for Semiconductor Technology, Aixtron 
makes devices that produce crystalline layers based on gallium nitride that are used as 
semiconductors in weapons systems. Its technology is being used to upgrade US and foreign-
owned Patriot missile defence systems. In 2016 it was revealed that Aixtron had suffered 
financial difficulties; its first quarter results in 2016 saw a 47% year-on-year drop in revenues 
and 65% drop in profits - although its annual revenues over the previous years showed a 
consistent, if small, improvement. In May of that year, a consortium of Chinese investors, incl. 
Grand Chip Investment GmbH, Grand Chip’s parent companies Grand Chip Investment S.a.r.l., 
Fujian Grand Chip Investment Fund LP, Fujian Grand’s partners, and Xiamen Bohao Investment 
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Co. Ltd.  offered to buy Aixtron for €670 million. The acquisition was partly funded by China IC 
Industry Investment Fund, a state-controlled entity in China. 
One month after the initial approval was granted in September 2016, the German authority 
withdrew clearance for the takeover. Aixtron’s US business includes a subsidiary, Aixtron Inc., 
that is headquartered in California. Following an assessment undertaken by CFIUS and citing 
security concerns of “the military applications of the overall technical body of knowledge and 
experience of Aixtron”, the Obama Administration blocked Fujian Grand Chip Investment from 
buying Aixtron US. Eventually, the Chinese investors’ offer to acquire Aixtron was withdrawn. 
Aixtron commented that it was now up to the government to support Germany’s technology 
industry and employees, for example by setting up an investment programme. 
 
Concerns about unfair competition from China through bids that cross between private 
investment and state-orchestrated takeovers (see the failed Aixtron takeover), have added to 
longstanding worries about the persistent lack of reciprocal access 
for EU companies to the Chinese market. Whereas by virtue of the 
‘Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry’ jointly issued by 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s 
top economic planning body, and the Ministry of Commerce, 
numerous sectors are prohibited (e.g. rare earth mining and 
tobacco), restricted (e.g. cloud computing) or limited to 
partnerships with Chinese companies (e.g. oil and gas), they are 
almost entirely open to Chinese firms in the EU.51 In addition, 
approval of FDI in China may still be subject to case-by-case scrutiny, 
at provincial and city level, creating uncertainty and arbitrariness. 
The overall FDI restrictiveness faced by foreign investors in China may be best depicted by the 
two figures52 below.   
                                                     
51 Note that the Catalogue may be updated on an ad hoc basis, especially in order to feed into the 5-year plan. 
52 Thanks to Mattia Di Salvo (CEPS), using OECD 2018 data. 
Whereas in China numerous 
sectors are prohibited (e.g. rare 
earth mining and tobacco), 
restricted (e.g. cloud computing) 
or limited to partnerships with 
Chinese companies (e.g. oil and 
gas), they are almost entirely 
open to Chinese firms in the EU. 
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Figure 5. OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 2017 
 
 
In 2017, as in previous years, China was one of the most FDI restrictive countries among 62 
countries surveyed by the OECD.  
 
Figure 6. China FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 1997-2017 
 
 
Between 1997 and 2017, FDI restrictiveness in China nearly halved, though changes are 
minimal in recent years.  
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This asymmetrical situation and the perceived regulatory gap on the side of member states and 
EU competition law triggered a debate in Brussels about the need for legislative action to create 
a new EU-wide FDI screening mechanism.53 The mood around Europe has also grown more 
defiant in the face of the world’s emerging hegemon. French President Emmanuel Macron 
stated during his visit to China in January 2018 that the Belt and Road Initiative could not be 
one way. Macron pushed Beijing to increase market access for French companies. Weeks later, 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that Germany remained committed to free trade 
but that it must be reciprocal. Yet, it is mainly EU institutions and capitals around Western 
Europe that are beating the drums; not so much the EU member states belonging to the 16+1. 
Given the diverging approaches and the need for better coordination, member states’ 
mechanisms should be replaced by a new consistent FDI screening mechanism at EU level vis-
à-vis third countries. 
EU-level 
The underlying philosophy of an EU-wide screening mechanism is that better coordination of 
national policies is contingent on a common legal framework to protect essential strategic 
interests, increase legal certainty and ensure transparency, while sustaining one of the most 
open investment regimes in the world. Although some experts 
have stressed that positive reciprocity rather than return harm 
should be privileged,54 the prevailing sentiment in Brussels is 
that a transparent EU-wide mechanism would provide certainty 
for investors and eliminate the inconsistencies of the current 
patchwork system. Insisting on transparency should also ensure 
fair competition within the remit of public procurement rules, 
not least because it is clear who buys in Europe and where the 
money comes from. A common review system would allow the 
identification of sectors that are vital for EU security, and where 
the concentration of economic power by non-EU investors risks being abused.    
The debate was launched officially in February 2017 by the French, German and Italian 
ministers of the economy with a common letter to EU Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia 
Malmström. On 13 September 2017 the European Commission, to coincide with Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union speech, unveiled a draft regulation on 
                                                     
53 See, e.g. Commission Decision of 29 November 2017 setting up the group of experts on the screening of foreign 
direct investments into the European Union, C(2017) 7866 final. In his speech before the European Parliament on 
17 April 2018, French President Macron gave new political impetus to plans to develop an EU-wide FDI screening 
mechanism. See https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/04/17/speech-by-emmanuel-macron-
president-of-the-republic-at-european-parliament.en.  
54 This would imply that FDI screening must be limited to national security considerations and that it must exclude 
economic security issues. 
The underlying philosophy of an EU-
wide screening mechanism is that 
better coordination of national policies 
is contingent on a common legal 
framework to protect essential 
strategic interests, increase legal 
certainty and ensure transparency, 
while sustaining one of the most open 
investment regimes in the world. 
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foreign direct investments in the EU.55 By November 2018, the Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission had agreed on the framework of the FDI screening. The Council formally adopted 
the Regulation on 5 March 2019,56 will enter into force in April and will fully apply in November 
2020.57 
The new instrument is expected to detect and raise awareness of foreign investment in critical 
assets, technologies and infrastructure. It will further allow for security and public order threats 
posed by acquisitions in sensitive sectors to be identified and addressed collectively. The 
framework prioritises cooperation between the Commission and the member states, enables 
the Commission to issue non-binding opinions on investment concerning several member 
states or when an investment could affect the “Union interest” (e.g. H2020 or Galileo), but 
leaves untouched member states’ competence to decide whether a particular investment 
threatens national security interests or public order. Member states will retain the power to 
review and potentially block FDI on security and public order grounds. In this way, they will not 
be required to adopt an FDI screening mechanism if they do not have one. However, existing 
and new mechanisms will have to respect a number of EU-wide norms, such as the non-
discrimination principle; the protection of confidential information; the right to judicial redress 
against national authorities' decisions or clearly defined applicable procedural rules. Member 
states should use the period between entry into force and the start of application of the 
Regulation to make the necessary changes to their national domestic practices and legislation 
and put in place the administrative structures to ensure effective cooperation at EU level with 
the Commission, in accordance with the established mechanisms.  
In reviewing FDI on the above-mentioned grounds, a member state may consider the potential 
effect of the investment on areas including: 
• Critical infrastructure (including energy, transport, communications, data storage, space 
or financial infrastructure, as well as sensitive facilities); 
• Critical technologies (including artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, 
technologies with potential dual use applications, cybersecurity, space or nuclear 
technology); 
• Security of supply of critical inputs; or 
• Access to sensitive information or the ability to control sensitive information. 
By way of further clarification, the FDI screening instrument provides that in determining 
whether a foreign investment is likely to affect security or public order, member states may 
                                                     
55 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union, Brussels, 13 September 2017, 
COM(2017) 487 final. 
56 Council Press Release, “Council greenlights rules on screening foreign direct investments”, 5 March 2019. For 
the draft Regulation see European Parliament and Council of the EU, PE-CONS 72/18, 2017/0224 (COD) Brussels, 
20 February 2019. 
57 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign 
direct investments into the Union (not yet published in the Official Journal). 
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take into account whether the foreign investor is controlled by the government of a third 
country, including through significant funding. In this sense, while the regulation would not be 
limited to covering investments by state-backed investors, such investors may find themselves 
subject to a greater degree of scrutiny. Ultimately, the list is non-exhaustive and includes a 
broad framework within which member states may choose to screen a planned foreign 
investment.  
The framework also builds in certain basic protections for foreign investors. This includes non-
discrimination between different third countries, transparency and judicial review – although 
the extent of this will clearly differ according to member states’ own legal systems. To ensure 
the effectiveness of the review mechanisms, it also allows member states to maintain, amend 
or adopt measures necessary to prevent their circumvention. This would include, for example, 
the possibility for member states to review investments by European-domiciled companies that 
are owned or controlled by a foreign investor, or artificial arrangements within the EU that do 
not reflect economic reality and that are designed to circumvent the review mechanism. 
Ultimately, finding the right balance of policy approaches is a matter of political judgement. As 
mentioned in the EU’s new Strategic Outlook on China, 
“neither the EU nor any of its Member States can effectively achieve their aims with 
China without full unity. In cooperating with China, all Member States, individually and 
within sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 16+1 format, have a 
responsibility to ensure consistency with EU law, rules and policies.”  
We will now turn to issues of regulatory convergence from a multilateral, regional and bilateral 
perspective. 
4. Increasing regulatory convergence? 
4.1 Multilateral dispute settlement 
A major grievance, not just on the side of the EU but among other BRI addressees as well, 
concerns dispute settlement. Given the all-encompassing and colossal scale of the BRI projects 
and the understandable logic of streamlining proceedings and cost effectiveness, in January 
2018 the Supreme People’s Court in China announced the setup of a dispute settlement 
mechanism dedicated to handle litigations that may arise from the 86 countries that the BRI 
currently involves. In fact, the Supreme People’s Court announced that three international 
commercial courts would be established to handle disputes related to projects under the BRI: 
one in Beijing (as headquarters), another in Shenzhen (for disputes arising on the Maritime Silk 
Road) and a third in Xi’an (for disputes along the Silk Road Economic Belt). In addition, the China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) was set up to establish a ‘Belt and Road 
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International Dispute Management’ Centre (in Shenzhen) which will assist arbitration centres 
like the one already set up in the Qianhai district.58  
However, going by the international canons on conflict of laws and the territoriality-based 
choice of law rules, courts normally respect the freedom of contractual parties to choose the 
law of the forum when determining the applicable law at times of dispute. Chinese law 
prescribes that, where parties to an international contract fail to select the applicable law, the 
contract will be governed by the law of the state that has the closest link to it.59 In the case of 
disputes regarding BRI-funded projects, Chinese legal logic prescribes that to be China.60 To 
other jurisdictions, however, if a dispute arises and where investment protection is governed 
by those states’ laws, that tort should fall under Chinese jurisdiction may be devoid of logic. 
Under the present blueprint of the BRI’s legal architecture, a lending or any other kind of 
commercial agreement concluded between China and another country will opt for Chinese 
jurisdiction as the law of the forum in the event of dispute.61 
If, as its leadership proclaims, China is committed to uphold 
and modernise the multilateral trade system,62 then it 
should mobilise the broad international buy-in for its 
connectivity and growth strategy to fit the BRI with a legal 
architecture and dispute settlement mechanism that spurs 
international solutions rather than imposes Chinese legal 
constructs.63 Given the magnitude of EU-China trade and 
investment links, the Union has stressed the importance of 
developing a more balanced and reciprocal economic 
relationship by working together with China in international 
                                                     
58 See M. Erie, “The China International Commercial Court: Prospects for Dispute Resolution for the ‘Belt and Road 
Initiative’”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 22, Issue 11, 31 August 2018. 
59 Cf. articles 4 and 6 of the Law on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations, as well as Article 126 of 
the Chinese Contract Law and Article 145 of the General Principle of Civil Law.   
60 For a special series of BRI-relevant judgments rendered by Chinese courts, see the website of the ‘Guiding 
Chinese Cases’ project of Stanford Law School, available at https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/.  
61 Recognising and enforcing foreign judgment in China is a difficult undertaking, treacherous and cost-consuming. 
See W. Zhang, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in China: Rules, Practices and Strategies, Kluwer 
Law International, 2014. 
62 See, e.g., Z. Ming, “China supports and upholds multilateral trading system”, EU Observer, 26 July 2018. 
63 In order to achieve a swift, less costly, dispute settlement solution, one may not be inclined to seek investor-to-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) as a solution. In recent years, UNCITRAL has identified a few concerns with the 
mechanism, such as consistency, coherence, predictability, correctness of arbitral decisions, cost and duration, 
which require improvement. Other concerns pertain to arbitrators and decision-makers, cost and duration of ISDS 
cases. For details, see “Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)”, note by the Secretariat, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III, Thirty-sixth session, Vienna, 29 October 
– 2 November 2018, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149.  
If, as its leadership proclaims, China is 
committed to upholding and modernisig 
the multilateral trade system, it should 
mobilise the broad international buy-in 
for its connectivity and growth strategy 
to fit the BRI with a legal architecture 
and dispute settlement mechanism that 
spurs international solutions rather than 
imposes Chinese legal constructs. 
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fora to upgrade the rules.64 Whereas the EU’s new Strategic Outlook on China focuses on the 
WTO, one could easily include the BRI as well. 
4.2 ‘16+1’ countries 
The regions of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are covered by distinct policies of 
the EU. Central Europe is all about the EU’s big enlargement of 2004, and the role of the now 
not-so-new member states. Eastern Europe for the EU is about the six Eastern Partnership 
states, of which three (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) have concluded ambitious Association 
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) with the EU. The region 
of South-Eastern Europe refers here to the pre-accession countries of the Western Balkans. 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the 2007, Croatia in 2013. 
The point of looking at these regions together is that they are all committed to applying or 
approximating EU regulations and standards,65 while China for its part has developed an 
ambitious multilateral initiative with 16 of these states, dubbed the ‘16+1’ initiative, into which 
projects under the BRI can fit. The 16 states are the three Baltic member states, the four 
Visegrad member states (Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), four South-Eastern member 
states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania), and five non-EU Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia); thus 11 out of the 28 EU member states 
plus the five non-members, but without the Eastern Partnership states. Should this unorthodox 
multilateral forum be of concern to the EU? It has actually raised two kinds of concern.  
The first concern is strictly economic, about matters of level (or uneven) playing fields in sectors 
relevant for BRI funding, notably in the construction and infrastructure sectors. As noted above, 
there are serious issues of competition, state aid and government procurement policies, and 
of the related role of Chinese state-owned enterprises that are of concern both within the EU 
and in regard to non-EU states that are approximating EU laws.  
The second concern, perceived but until recently less visible in official European diplomatic 
exchanges, is of a more geopolitical character, where China applies ‘divide and rule’ tactics to 
develop economic clientele relationships with member and neighbouring 
states at the expense of common EU policies agreed in Brussels. Within 
the EU, Hungary (Box 10) is often referred to for breaking the consensual 
EU approach towards the BRI. This is not to say that other member states 
never lent a helping hand to Beijing, for instance to prevent it from being 
rapped over the knuckles for its poor track record on human rights66 and 
territorial claims in the South China Sea,67 and for promoting its market 
                                                     
64 JOIN(2019) 5 final, 12 March 2019, at 6. 
65 Except for the three non-DCFTA Eastern Partnership states, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, although Armenia’s 
new agreement with the EU contains a limited amount of approximation to the EU’s acquis. 
66 See “Greece blocks EU's criticism at UN of China's human rights record”, The Guardian, 18 June 2017. 
67 See “EU’s statement on South China Sea reflects divisions”, Reuters, 15 July 2016. 
China applies ‘divide and rule’ 
tactics to develop economic 
clientele relationships with 
member and neighbouring 
states at the expense of 
common EU policies. 
32 | BLOCKMANS & HU 
 
economy status.68 Bigger member states like Italy and richer ones like France and Germany 
have exhibited similar behaviour.69 But the sub-regional ‘16+1’ structure remains unique. 
Box 10. Hungary as China’s ‘Trojan horse’ in the EU? 
On 14 May 2017, at the maiden Belt and Road summit in Beijing, the EU refused to sign the final 
communiqué. But Hungary later broke ranks and did sign the document. In April 2018, 27 out of 
28 EU member state ambassadors in Beijing, with Hungary again the exception, reiterated that 
stance when they signed a document denouncing the BRI for hampering free trade and giving 
an advantage to Chinese companies. The document, which was prepared with a view to the Sino-
EU Summit of 25 June 2018 and leaked to the German newspaper Handelsblatt, said that China 
was attempting to shape globalisation to suit its own interests and that the Belt and Road 
Initiative was “pursuing domestic political goals like the reduction of surplus capacity, the 
creation of new export markets and safeguarding access to raw materials”.70 The document, 
which was never formally released, further stated that the BRI “runs counter to the EU agenda 
for liberalising trade and pushes the balance of power in favour of subsidised Chinese 
companies”. The report cautioned that European companies might not secure good contracts if 
China was not compelled to the EU principles of transparency in public procurement, as well as 
environmental and social standards.71 
 
In the context of the Union and its neighbourhoods, the EU institutions should be concerned 
about the 16+1 process acquiring such substance and momentum that could undermine the 
setting of EU policies that sought to be protective of its own interests, values and law. 
In terms of trade between China and the 16 CEEC countries, in 2017 trade in goods between 
the 16 and China amounted to €57.3 billion, a small amount compared to the total EU-China 
trade of €573 billion and falling short of the initial aim to reach US$100 billion by 2015. Each of 
                                                     
68 See “It is in Hungary’s interests for China to be afforded market economy status”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Hungary, 9 June 2016 (http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/it-is-in-
hungary-s-interests-for-china-to-be-afforded-market-economy-status). 
69 D. Ghiglione et al., “Italy set to formally endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Financial Times, 6 March 2019. 
If and when the fractious governing coalition in Rome signs a memorandum of understanding with China in 
support of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, it would make Italy the 14th EU member state to do so. In the history 
of EU-China relations, there are other occasions when member states bowed to the imperial ‘divide and rule’, too, 
often to secure their respective commercial interests with China. For example, in 1997, France, Germany, Spain 
and Italy refused to endorse an EU resolution condemning China’s human rights record for submitting to the UN 
Commission on Human Rights. As a result, Denmark took the initiative and drafted it without EU support. China 
retaliated against Denmark for the resolution and the Netherlands, holder of the EU Presidency, for making a 
China-critical speech at the UNCHR and trying to draft the EU-wide resolution. Between 1989 and 1996, the EU 
had sponsored such a resolution annually. See “Political values in Europe-China relations”, ETNC Report, at 17, 59. 
70 See “EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road”, Handelsblatt, 17 April 2018. 
71 A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry later said that the EU had clarified the issue and that the 
Handelsblatt report about the ambassadors’ document was inaccurate. See “EU presents (nearly) united front 
against China’s ‘unfair’ Belt and Road Initiative”, South China Morning Post, 20 April 2018.  
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the 16 run a trade deficit with China. Poland is by far the biggest trading partner with China, 
followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. China’s FDI stock in the 16 is fairly low and also 
shows a strong geographical concentration in the bigger EU-11. Serbia is the only Western 
Balkan country to have attracted sizeable FDI from China. 
Figure 7. China's FDI stock in the CEECs, 2013-2016  
 
Source: G. Grieger, “China, the 16+1 format and the EU”, EPRS, September 2018, using Eurostat data.  
 
The controversial aspects of the BRI in general, especially in Asia and Africa, are its debt-
financing of huge projects that are not subject to the normal governance standards of the 
classic international financial institutions (World Bank, EBRD). Such projects were, initially at 
least, accepted with some alacrity by countries with corrupt authoritarian regimes. There are 
already signs of push-back against such experiences (Malaysia, Sri Lanka). The concluding 
declaration of the fifth annual 16+1 summit meeting, hosted by Bulgaria in Sofia in July 2018, 
showed some diplomatic sensitivity to these concerns, with the first page of text stressing how 
the 16+1 activities would be fully respectful of EU laws and policies.72 The text went on a further 
15 pages to describe how the 16+1 would be working to a comprehensive agenda, coinciding 
with many EU competences. In addition, the EU is now invited to join these summit meetings 
as an observer. But these are just diplomatic gestures, while the 16+1 process goes full steam 
ahead and the next meeting is scheduled to take place immediately after the 21st EU-China 
Summit in April 2019. 
The East European states, outside the 16+1, introduce other issues. Of special interest is the 
role of Georgia, which has followed up on its DCFTA with the EU with a more limited classic free 
                                                     
72 Sofia Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, 9 July 2018, 
available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1577455.shtml.   
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trade agreement with China. Georgia also seeks to play a transport hub role in connecting 
Europe and Asia with a route that offers an alternative to the northern route through Russia. 
The idea of having free trade with both the EU and China relates to the historic role of the Silk 
Road of past centuries, when Central Asian states and Iran were significant economic powers 
that were not just transit passages, but also locations for value-adding industry for the products 
that moved along the old Silk Road.73 The EU for its part wishes Georgia and the other DCFTA 
states to succeed in their economic modernisation and development. If there turns out to be 
positive synergies here between the EU and BRI policies, then that is to be welcomed. The EU 
is also interested in preventing the BRI from becoming a Russian transit monopoly for land 
trade between itself and China. In this respect geopolitical considerations become a more 
complex trilateral affair involving the EU, China and Russia. 
When examining the 16+1 cooperation in light of the BRI, the former provides a convenient 
vehicle for China to venture into the territories of the 16 CEECs. Nonetheless, this risks 
disrupting the Union’s strategy towards China as a whole. At the same time, as China’s BRI 
investment in infrastructure and energy often entails bad practices incompatible with EU’s 
rules and norms, it is enough to say that China’s 16+1 cooperation initiative is something of an 
irritant in the eyes of the EU. Then again, those bad practices are often a consequence of easy 
money that tarnish the good repute that China wishes for its global competitiveness strategy. 
As mentioned above (section 4.1), another  grievance against the lending practice of China’s 
billion-euro loans granted to CEECs is the choice of law at times of dispute.74 Presently, China’s 
investment along the BRI is largely facilitated by intergovernmental on-lending agreements 
concluded between policy banks, such as those between the China Development Bank and the 
Hungarian Development Bank. As the terms of such agreements are often kept confidential, it 
seems that disputes will fall under Chinese jurisdiction, as is the case of Kostolac B in Serbia. 
Box 11. Kostolac B3 power plant in Serbia 
The construction of the 350 MW lignite power plant, Kostolac B3, by the Serbian state-owned 
utility Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) near Pozarevac is the second phase of a project implemented 
by the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) and financed by the China EximBank. 
In the first place, in November 2013, the Serbian government signed an agreement with CMEC 
for the construction of Kostolac B3, and no tender procedure took place. Instead, the Chinese 
and Serbian governments signed an intergovernmental agreement freeing joint projects from 
tender obligations. Second, the Serbian government and the China EximBank in December 2014 
signed a loan agreement worth $608 million (€537 million) for Kostolac B3 and expansion of the 
Drmno open-cast lignite mine. On 19 January 2015, the Serbian parliament voted on the loan 
                                                     
73 See P. Frankopan, The Silk Roads – A New History of the World, London: Bloomsbury, 2015. 
74 See G. Grieger, “China, the 16+1 format and the EU”, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2018. 
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ratification in an extraordinary session announced to the public less than 24 hours in advance. It 
includes, among others, the stipulation that any arbitration would be carried out in Beijing.75  
 
All in all, the 16+1 cooperation appears to be a convenient vehicle for the BRI to venture into 
Central and Eastern Europe. The multimillion-euro question that (aspirant) countries of the EU 
should ask themselves is whether their affiliation to China’s way of doing business risks 
compromising their duty of sincere cooperation with the EU (still the biggest investor) and 
adherence to its acquis (Article 4(3) TEU). 
4.3 EU-China bilateral relations 
In an effort to circle the wagons as Beijing makes political and economic inroads into the wider 
European regulatory space, the European Commission and the High Representative pushed the 
member states into endorsing a consistent posture to deepen cooperation with China on trade 
and investment while dealing with strategic and security tensions around Chinese technology.76 
The EU also wants to seal an ambitious Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with 
China by 2020. It is expected that language to that effect will be included in the joint 
communiqué of the 21st EU-China Summit on 9 April 2019. 
The EU ambition for a 2020 deadline for the bilateral investment agreement reveals a new level 
of activism in bilateral ties, after painfully slow progress during 19 rounds of negotiations that 
took place between 2013 and 2018.77 After the 19th round of 
negotiations (Beijing, 29-30 November 2018), it was reported that for 
the first time both parties provided their formal feedback on the 
market access offers exchanged in the margins of the 20th EU-China 
Summit in 2018.78 Progress was made in particular on investment 
protection-related provisions such as expropriation and compensation 
for losses. On state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlement 
additional technical follow up was required. For fair and equitable treatment as well as on 
national treatment and its related provisions and exceptions, still further substantial follow up 
was needed, together with discussions on transfers and capital movement provisions, which 
remains at an initial stage. On sustainable development, parties are said to move closer on their 
understanding of investment-related aspects of environment and labour. 
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Buoyed by a stable economy, China had already committed to remove ownership caps in 
certain financial services sectors by 2021 and on car manufacturing by 2022. The decision of 
the NRDC in July 2018 to shorten its ‘negative list’ by easing or scrapping foreign ownership 
limits on surveying and mapping, power grids, shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing,79 was 
intended to woo European investors at a time when US tariffs on Chinese imports came into 
effect. China’s plans will sound like music to the ears of European politicians and business 
leaders, but deliverables are required to convince the European Commission that China is 
serious about following up on all of its intentions. In negotiations on a revised Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) in the context of the WTO, the European Commission has 
advocated an ambitious opening of international public procurement markets.80 Since 
December 2007, China has submitted six offers for negotiating to accede to the GPA. In its last 
offer, submitted in December 2014, China made considerable concessions with regard to, 
among others, covered entities, activities and thresholds; the grace period for implementing 
the Agreement was also proposed to reduce from five to three years.81 Nonetheless, the sixth 
offer did not meet the expectations of the GPA members. Further negotiations are ongoing.82  
In the meantime, in January 2016, the Commission adopted an 
amended proposal for International Procurement Instrument 
(IPI), a regulation ‘on the access of third-country goods and 
services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement 
and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union 
goods and services to the public procurement markets of third 
countries’.83 Once the IPI is implemented, it may help to 
guarantee reciprocity of access to public procurement markets in the EU and China by 
European and Chinese businesses. However, the file seems to be stuck in the legislative process 
and is unlikely to be adopted any time soon. An EP resolution adopted in September 2018 calls 
on the Council to swiftly adopt the IPI, and to be vigilant and take action against contracts 
awarded to foreign enterprises suspected of dumping practices. One of the ten action points 
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issued by the Commission and High Representative in their Strategic Outlook document of 12 
March 2019 urges the Parliament and the Council to adopt the IPI before the end of 2019.84  
Amid worries that US President Trump might withdraw the US from the World Trade 
Organization (a move that would require US Congressional support), the EU-China Summit of 
16 July 2018 concluded with an agreement to set up a joint working group for concrete 
cooperation on WTO modernisation in key areas relevant for the global level playing field, such 
as industrial subsidies. For the EU, this joint working group serves as an additional instrument 
to exert pressure on China to align its trade practice with the WTO principle of national 
treatment and to accede to the GPA in an expeditious manner.85  
5. Concluding remarks 
Chinese policymakers like to brand the BRI as a “win-win cooperation”. There is, however, a 
marked disconnect between that rhetoric, the realities on the ground, and increasingly 
negative perceptions in the EU about this cooperation. Europeans are waking up to the fact 
that all roads no longer lead to Rome but to Beijing, and that they are lagging behind China and 
the US in preparing for the 4th industrial revolution – an international economy based on 
telecommunications infrastructure, artificial intelligence and space technologies.86 Member 
state governments have been responding to aggressive overtures from China towards their 
economies to protect their strategic sectors. But in spite of the 2018 EU Strategy on Connecting 
Europe and Asia, Europe’s response overall has been rather incoherent. The strategic course 
correction of March 2019 aims to change this. 
Our own empirical research has exposed the need to plug the gaps in the intersection between 
EU competition law, rules on state aid and public procurement, and the regulatory patchwork 
of member states’ FDI review mechanisms. In the political sphere, member states would do 
better to coordinate their actions at 27/28 and to prevent the Union from falling prey to the 
imperial doctrine of ‘divide and rule’. Even if its relative global weight is waning, the European 
Union is still the world’s largest economic collective and a regulatory powerhouse to be 
reckoned with. Existing EU legislation (for example on public procurement) already has a 
deterrent effect on malpractices (cf. delayed investments, derailed proposals) and the new EU-
level FDI screening mechanism will help to reinforce these legal defences.  
Nevertheless, Europe must not fall into the trap of protectionism. It should not ignore the fact 
that, over the past four decades, China has accrued considerable economic strength and know-
how. Beijing can be a constructive partner, especially in view of an unpredictable trading 
partner across the Atlantic. The EU needs to perform a delicate balancing act to convince China 
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of the need for a level playing field and to turn the Belt and Road Initiative into a two-way street 
for economic growth. This is not only in Western Europe’s interest – the main trading and 
investment destination for China – but also in that of the 16 countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as the Caucasian and Central Asian countries along the new Silk Road. 
Reciprocal benefits rather than mutual harm.  
The assertiveness expressed by the EU’s new Strategic Outlook on China should alert 
policymakers in Beijing to the fact that Europe’s common legal defences will bar Chinese 
investors from the single market if, in spite of a change of official rhetoric in favour of free and 
fair trade two years ago, the BRI continues to lack inclusiveness, fails to invite foreign 
participants, and does not observe best practices of commercial and legal governance. For the 
sake of the BRI’s success and mutual economic benefit, Chinese policymakers would be well 
advised to address European concerns in a fair-minded and constructive manner, rather than 
stonewall the EU with ever-louder empty messages that the Belt and Road Initiative is a 
panacea for all. 
